Suffused with his own agenda, Mar-tin failed to mention the most portentous moment of last spring: the events surrounding April 13–14.
In early April George Bush was reeling. Former counter-terrorism advisor Richard Clarke had delivered his shot across the bow. Bob Woodward had talked to everyone of substance, they had talked back, and inside the Beltway the talk was all about the truth behind the Plan of Attack on “the Iraq file.” Beyond particular revelations, clearly the U.S. administration believed, or decided to believe, that 9/11 ushered in an era in which only American might could reshape the world into a benign creature governed by law and enterprise. It was not, and could not be, that this horrendous event linked America to a world increasingly beset by terrorist acts; rather, it was, and must be, that it made America the exception to the growing rule. All evidence and every shred of historical memory had to be recalibrated to suit the new paradigm.
With a rookie president inclined to build only his own nation, what began as a backroom sideshow (since the early 1990s, Dick Cheney and other neo-conservatives had been working the back-rooms arguing for preemptive wars against evil) became a gathering storm. The UN was disparaged as a hopeless talk shop, while CIA findings in Iraq and the hesitations of Colin Powell were summarily dismissed. An unlikely troika (Iran and North Korea were thrown in for political cover, or in case another war was necessary), the “Axis of Evil,” with Osama, somehow, as its guiding force of darkness, had set its sights on benevolent America.
By mid-April, the Bush administration’s ability to shape the truth was coming unstuck. With weapons of mass destruction not yet found, and with Iraqis cheering the dead bodies of American security consultants hanging high above jubilant crowds, the “liberation” was metamorphosing into a hated occupation. Unable to keep images of growing U.S. casualties – in coffins draped by the Stars and Stripes – from television screens, on Tuesday, April 13, Bush addressed the nation.
Beneath the bluster of a Commander-in-Chief with fighting troops on the ground – “stay the course”; “we will prevail” – Bush stepped back from American unilateralism, expressing a need for international involvement. Not until after the November 2 elections, could the President issue a mea culpa; but, under the strident language, there was enough in his speech to suggest to “soft power” advocates that a reversal of fortune was afoot.
And then there was Wednesday, April 14. Remember it.
If on Tuesday Bush was a leader unsure, by Wednesday Karl Rove and company had righted the ship. Knowing (or instructed?) that he needed a foreign policy coup, that the transformation of the Middle East into a peace-able kingdom wasn’t panning out, Bush welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to Washington, proclaimed the White House his second home, and endorsed Sharon’s “two-state solution.” Relinquishing the Gaza Strip – a sliver of land overpopulated, impoverished, and with the economic potential of Rikers Island – to the Palestinians was embraced by Bush as a magnanimous concession on the “road map” to peace.
The endorsement – a photo-op handshake without the road map coalition partners (the UN, the European Union, Russia) even as background imagery – has produced the predictable results: more suicide bombings, recriminations from the Arab world, and rejection from hard-line Israeli settlers. Facing a corruption scandal and possible indictment, Sharon needed a helping hand. In the blink of an eye, Bush gave him his full support.
Having recovered from his momentary lapse (April 13), on April 14, the world according to Bush was re-articulated: There are only two hard powers, the U.S. and Al Q’aeda, and as terrorists obey no rules of engagement, no rules of engagement will be imposed upon us. Sharon, ever the masterful politician, appealed to Bush on the two fronts that he cannot resist: unilateralism and fighting terrorism. That the “unilateral disengagement” of Gaza came with strings attached (firming up Israeli West Bank settlements, no Palestinian right of return to homes in Israel, etc.), and that the road map coalition partners had agreed that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict must be resolved by Israelis and Palestinians, mattered little, or not at all.
Regarding the Gaza Strip, Sharon may have no choice but to eventually negotiate directly with Palestinians. This is the micro point. The macro point is that, as April 14 demonstrated, if President Bush so decides, coalitions, diplomacy, etc. can all come to naught. Might is right, and agreements, like constitutions, are just words on paper.
