Even so, Canada has committed almost $1 billion for military expenditures and aid over the next three years and, as part of an aggressive US-led mission dubbed Operation Archer, was set to deploy additional troops in January, making the Canadian contingent 2,000 strong. Furthermore, this sum-mer, Canada will play a key role in the transition from American to nato command, which will allow the US to remove 2,500 of the 19,000 troops it has stationed in the Afghan theatre. Those in charge are aware that our army is now in a firefight potentially as dangerous as the Korean War, where 516 Canadian soldiers perished.
If President Bush employed temperate language and moderate hopes, Prime Minister Paul Martin warned Canadians last July that “we are at war” against terrorism in Afghanistan and that more of our soldiers could die. Soft-power advocates such as former Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy accept that creating stability (and delivering aid) in failed states must sometimes be done at the end of a gun barrel. But Axworthy fears that Operation Archer is actually the opening act in a dramatic shift away from traditional Canadian “peace-building” and containment policies toward confronting terrorism on the battlefield. In short, without any significant public debate, Canada has moved much closer to the post-9/11 security agenda of the United States and is now taking the fight directly to the lairs and caves of terrorists themselves. In so doing, Canada may well sacrifice the international impartiality it established by not engaging in the Iraq war and, at home, by resisting US overtures vis-a-vis continental missile defence.
Those who see a link between trade and foreign affairs believe Canada has good reason for doing so. The American security agenda extends overseas and across North America, and, as the United States consumes nearly 80 per-cent of Canadian exports and provides nearly 65 percent of our foreign direct investment, its demands for beefed-up Canadian military support, enhanced border security, and diplomatic cover can be rebuffed for only so long. According to military historian Jack Granatstein, Ottawa now realizes “that their policies will have more clout if Canada has military forces to deploy.” Added David Bercuson, director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, “The Liberals got themselves between a rock and a hard place, because not going to Iraq posed the question, ‘What are you going to do?’ They clearly picked the Afghan mission as a means of sidestepping Iraq and saying, ‘Look, we are participating in the larger conflict of which you say Iraq is a part.’ ” In the entwined corridors between Defence, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade, and through shuttle diplomacy between Ottawa and Washington, the thinking may be that we will finally resolve the softwood-lumber issue and keep our border open to trade by lessening America’s burden in Afghanistan.
“The Americans were furious,” said Granatstein, commenting on Canada’s non-participation in Iraq. “[They] would have been happy with no Canadian soldiers. What they wanted was one Canadian flag.” Granatstein believes that Jean Chretien supported engagement but that, facing backbench rancour and unalloyed rejection in Quebec of the idea of sending troops to Iraq, he succumbed to the political pressure. Feeling that he had to give the US something, Chretien agreed to send troops to Afghanistan. But he misjudged how rapidly events would unfold, and since 2003 Canada’s commitment has been silently growing.
After the 2004 election, Prime Minister Martin launched foreign policy and defence reviews, the results of which included refashioning the military into an integrated force that could fight shoulder to shoulder with US troops. Bill Graham was installed as minister of Defence, Pierre Pettigrew became minister of Foreign Affairs, and, to increase the military’s profile and signal Canada’s seriousness to Washington, Rick Hillier (previously in charge of land forces) was promoted to general and chief of Defence staff.
Following 9/11, Douglas Bland, chair of Defence Management Studies at Queen’s University, wrote, “One clear message from the ‘9-11’ crisis is that trust [between Canada and the US] is greatly diminished, and now Canadians are exposed to intrusive American demands for changes to Canadian domestic politics.” The thinking goes that Canada must repair the damage done by Chretien, and make up for the lost opportunity. Not assuming real responsibility in the international war against terrorism, Bland suggested, threatens a “radical transformation” in the relationship between Canada and the United States, with the latter moving aggressively to expand its military role in North American continental security.
Though General Hillier is well liked and battle-tested from his experiences in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, his promotion didn’t fit the military’s traditional pattern. According to protocol, it was the navy’s turn to supply the top gun, but the Prime Minister’s Office intervened, Martin clearly wanting someone aggressive — a warrior, not a diplomat. Thus far, Hillier hasn’t disappointed. With Martin’s support, he has announced his intent to recruit 8,000 new soldiers and rebuild the military in terms of both its prestige and effectiveness. More importantly, he created Canada Command, which will turn the military into an expeditionary force, with the infantry, navy, and air force coordinating responses to terrorist attacks, both in North America and overseas.
Hillier wants Canadians to recognize why the changes were needed: “We’re into a new era where instability and terrorists and militia forces are threats,” he said last summer. “Global instability could cause some of these things to come home to roost in Canada, and I want the population to really understand that we are asking these young men and women to die.” That is, Canadian troops are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in wars that are in the national self-interest.
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