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photography by Farah Nosh

Soldiers Not Peacekeepers

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We are at war. Will Canada admit it?

by Sean Maloney

photography by Farah Nosh

Published in the March 2006 issue.  » BUY ISSUE     

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There was both a plea and a “grow up, Canada” tone to Hillier’s comments, which also seemed to disavow the old notion — espoused by Chretien in 1999 in reference to peacekeepers delivering aid to East Timor — that our armed forces are “always there, like Boy Scouts . . . Canadians love it. They think it is a nice way for Canadians to be present in the world.

“Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement contains only a few mentions of Canadian soldiers as blue-helmeted peacekeepers operating under United Nations command. Instead, the statement suggests that the Canadian military will now be engaged in “stabilization operations” that require soldiers to wage war to advance foreign-policy goals, something they are now doing by killing insurgents in Afghanistan. The report refers to humanitarian-aid objectives by stating, “Our military could be engaged in combat against well-armed militia in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over.” In Afghanistan, aid will be delivered in order to win support for the fledgling government of Hamid Karzai.

Are Canadians prepared to accept a wider role for the military — one that includes sending soldiers abroad to fight and be killed? While Conservative Leader Stephen Harper promised $17 billion for the armed forces over the next five years and an elite airborne battalion of 650 soldiers, judging by the winter election debates, the answer is decidedly no. Over four debates in both official languages, not once was the issue of Canada’s entry into Afghanistan and engagement with the war on terrorism seriously raised. One was left to wonder whether Canada has become a myopic, even parochial, state that is not ready to engage in the fight against international terrorism.

The irony of this situation is that the icon of Canadian peacekeeping, Pearson, actually countenanced peacemaking and the use of force when necessary. He did not insist that the army was best suited to delivering aid rather than firing bullets. After winning the Nobel Peace Prize for helping resolve the Suez crisis in 1956, Pearson, who later became prime minister, engaged in a bitter dispute with Washington over defence. He wanted to create an expeditionary force similar to the one currently fighting in Afghanistan, believing that many foreign conflicts — often steeped in ancestral and/or ethnic claims of entitlement — required more than negoti-ations and foreign aid to solve. In short, he wanted to create a rapid-reaction “stability” force that could be deployed to wage war if it meant a lasting peace could be achieved.

Under Pearson, the military made plans to purchase a squadron of transport jets with global reach, as well as ships that would carry the revolutionary tilt-winged aircraft. When Trudeau replaced Pearson as prime minister in 1968, he halted these initiatives. In the ensuing years, Canada’s military declined from nearly 100,000 troops to less than 60,000 today. The Vietnam fiasco and the easy political play of distancing Canada from US militarism changed the attitudes of Canadians, who increasingly embraced the idea that their soldiers were peacekeepers. It helped that peacekeeping was cheaper, since it didn’t require the government to constantly update the military’s arsenal or replace worn-out equipment, such as the critically important Hercules aircraft.

In a prophetic warning just prior to 9/11, Gordon Giffin, then the US ambassador to Canada, said: “If [Canada’s] defence relationship erodes in a meaningful way, it could affect the fabric of the whole relationship.” And since 9/11, politicians on both sides of the House of Commons have supported rebuilding the military along the lines that Pearson long ago envisioned and the White House now wants. Estimates for such an upgrade begin at $30 billion.

The mission in Afghanistan is the first example of what a more robust Canadian military can do. After a long period in which our overseas war fighting capacity was confined primarily to bases in Europe — where 10,000 soldiers trained, many in tanks or in planes with nuclear-tipped weapons, to fight in an anticipated third world war as part of nato — Canada is now engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign that brings all the elements of the country’s power to bear: military force, diplomacy, economic power, and development assistance. The experience will illustrate how Canada might be involved in the war on terrorism in the future.

One unique aspect of the new strategy is the way that development and humanitarian aid are being used specifically for the purpose of building loyalty toward coalition forces and democratic reforms. The American, British, and Canadian governments all have representatives from their international development and relief agencies stationed in Afghanistan; the Canadian International Development Agency (cida) alone plans to spend $616 million there by 2009. But the responsibility for taking aid workers into and out of remote areas falls to the patrol company, which is part of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (prt) in Kandahar, where Sergeant Bradley and nearly 200 other soldiers are based.

Unlike traditional Canadian peace-keeping units, which would deliver aid but not engage either side of the conflict, prts, in what could be a model for future expeditionary forces, are front-line fighting units. Most of the soldiers come from 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, based in Edmonton, and many do not want their names used in print, fearing the enemy has ties to jihadist groups, including al Qaeda and its supporters in Canada. “We are targets and they want to kill us to stop our work,” said a US aid representative whose convoy was attacked later in the week. “They will do anything to stop us helping the Afghan people.”

Soldiers and aid workers make these dangerous trips to remote areas to assist populations terrorized by insurgents not only to get help there, but as a show of force. “The war will be won in the hinterland, with the people,” said Colonel Steven Bowes, the prt commander. “The enemy uses these areas as sanctuaries, and conventional military operations can only succeed up to a point. Projects that improve the basic living standard are a start, but we are not into development for development’s sake.”

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