An Old World Solution

ocated at the southern tip of Spain, on the shores of the Medi­terranean Sea, the small Andalusian town of Tarifa is a windsurfer’s paradise. Each year thousands of enthusiasts come from near and far to test themselves against the winds gusting off the Atlantic Ocean, enjoy the balmy sunshine, and sample a nightlife that pulsates with a certain European vig­our. For the footloose and well-to-do, Tarifa is a playground. But a mere fourteen kilometres across the Strait of Gibraltar, and clearly visible from Tarifa’s sandy beaches, rise the rugged slopes of Morocco’s north shore, where an altogether different reality persists.

The ancient Greeks referred to the rocky outcroppings of the Strait of Gibraltar as the Pillars of Hercules. It is here that Africa ends and Europe begins, that poverty and destitution are linked with, yet divided from, hope and opportunity. As a naval outpost still under British sovereignty—a fact that rankles Spanish national feelings—Gibraltar seems anachron­istic, tied, however tangentially, only to Britons seeking summer sun on Spain’s warm shoreline. Following the Moors’ great push across North Af­rica, they conquered the Iberian Peninsula in the eighth century and controlled a great part of Spain until the fifteenth century. The Islamic conquerors were ultimately defeated, but the syncretic blending of cultures produced a legacy still very much in evidence.

And across the Mediterranean there may be a new convergence under way. Behind the windsurfers of Tarifa and pleasure locations across the north shore of the Mediterranean Sea, power politics and extraordinary business deals between European and North African countries are leading to agreements that could fundamentally reshape the economic power and geopolitical significance of the entire region. It is a great game that could dramatically improve the fortunes of countries across the Maghrib—from Egypt to Morocco—and supply Europe with one of its most pressing needs: a secure energy supply. But, as in all great games, there are numerous hurdles to overcome first.

Today, even in the heightened cli­mate of terrorist threats and the supposed “clash of civilizations,” it is not so much the jihadists—or even shadowy sects of Islam known as Salafists (thought by many to be responsible for recent terrorist attacks in Europe)—who are the primary concern of Spain and the European Union. Rather, it is the thousands of black Africans escaping penury and starvation and descending on the con­tinent’s shores looking for a way—any way—into the European paradise.

In Spain, the Moroccans, numbering roughly 500,000, constitute one of the country’s largest immigrant groups, and their integration into Spanish society has been anything but smooth. However, Moroccans no longer occupy the lowest rank. That position is now held by newly arrived sub-Saharan Africans, most of whom toil at picking tomatoes and peppers in the plastic hothouses of Murcia and Almeria or at other forms of menial and temporary employment. Working without secur­ity or benefits and at subsistence wages, these black Africans are deemed necessary for their labour and their labour only. After the picking seasons have ended they move on to low-paid jobs in Spain’s construction boom. But desperate people will do desperate things, and black Africans continue to spill into the Iberian Peninsula. Their methods of arrival continue to create concern.

Following his March 2004 election victory, Spain’s socialist prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, made his first official visit to Morocco. Having defeated José María Aznar and the Popular Party’s attempts to capitalize on the Madrid bombings by promoting—among other polar­izing pol­icies—isolationism from North Africa, Zapatero’s spirits ran high and the symbolism of this visit was lost on no one. Just the same, improving relations with Morocco over illegal immigration coming from Morocco’s northern coast and, increasingly, from the disputed territory of Western Sahara is no easy matter. The Spanish have questioned not only Morocco’s management of that territory but also its very sovereignty over it. And such statements by the former colonial power have been met with stiff rebukes. “Neither I nor the people of Morocco will ever accept giving up Morocco’s sovereignty over these provinces [Western Sahara],” said Morocco’s King Mohammed VI during a January 2005 official visit from Spain’s King Juan Carlos.

The Spanish ruler made it clear that a solution had to be found within the framework of the United Nations. The difficulty is that all international resolutions about the issue of the Western Sahara—including UN direc­tives, the Baker Plan (named after former US secretary of state James Baker), and the negotiated settlement now being advocated by Peruvian diplomat Alvaro deSoto—ultimately point to allowing the indigenous population, the Saharawis, to vote on self-determination. The situation is further complicated by Algeria’s open support for the remnants of Frente polisario, a Western Saharan resistance group, something that has long soured its relations with neighbouring Morocco.

From the Spanish perspective, while Rabat, the Moroccan capital, claims to be controlling the outflow of il­legal immigrants, Madrid insists other­wise. In 2004, 289 bodies of drowned Africans were picked up in the waters between Morocco and the Spanish territories (from Cadiz to the Canary Islands), and that same year over 7,000 others were intercepted off the island of Fuerteventura alone. Last year, the number of drowned rose to 368.

In September, hundreds of sub-Sa­haran Africans besieged the controversial Spanish outpost of Ceuta on Morocco’s north shore. Many got through, but five were shot and killed. Then, in October, much the same thing happened at Melilla, this time resulting in six deaths. To prepare for these raids the Africans hid in inhospitable scrublands, fashioned makeshift ladders out of local materials, and, eventually, scaled two rows of chain-link and barbed-wire fences protecting each of the two towns. Many of those who succeeded in their dangerous gamble did so only after being badly bruised from falls or seriously cut by the razor-sharp wire. In scenes both horrendous and pathetic, apprehended Africans were shown on Spanish television, handcuffed in pairs and paraded into deportation buses. Prior to these events, it was reported that the Moroccan police had transported hundreds of escapees deep into the desert and abandoned them there without food or water.

Madrid sent a contingent of troops to help the Civil Guard of Ceuta and Melilla, and talks are under way about building a third fence around each town. But the desire for freedom is such that an underground economy of body-runners and speedboat operators—the visible edge of organized crime based in Morocco, Spain, and all around Gibraltar—has long been ferrying people (and drugs) across the Strait. These mercenaries charge, on average, 1,000 euros per person, cram thirty people into boats designed for eight, and offer no guarantees of safe landing. The Spanish government has responded by arming the coast guard with infrared cameras, radars, thermal sensors, and the manpower required to pick up small crafts approaching the Spanish coast. It is a dangerous nighttime game of high-speed cat and mouse, and encounters between the coast guard and the body-runners usually result in the latter dumping their human cargo—including pregnant women and children—overboard or unloading them on a lonely beach, with some suffering from hypothermia and all exhausted and without resources.