3D Vision

Of course, if 3D rests on the assump­tion that only a comprehensive approach to the problems plaguing Afghan­istan will be successful, then our partners must also coordinate. But we are operating as part of a thirty-seven-member coalition, ISAF, in which national contingents often have different mandates, priorities, and tactics. In September 2006, for example, the UK negotiated a deal in the Musa Qala district of Helmand province whereby tribal leaders would take control of the area if both Taliban and British forces withdrew. The United States viewed the compromise as a surrender, and when the Taliban overran Musa Qala in February 2007, ISAF, under US leadership, authorized air strikes rather than re­negotiating the deal.

Debates over relative contributions and rules of engagement have also been fierce. The US, having initially secured the country with Operation Enduring Freedom, refocused most of its resour­ces and troops to Iraq before it could contribute to the rebuilding process. Had the US stayed, Afghanistan would likely be more stable, and non-military personnel like Gavin Buchan would be in a better position to do their jobs.

We have a long way to go in Afghanistan. A recent Canadian Senate report pointed out that medieval societies change slowly, corruption is endemic, and the Taliban has the home-court advantage. Unfortunately, the Senate’s recommendations, which included additional military training, direct CIDA funding for military-led development projects, and the establishment of a corruption reduction strategy, simply do not match the scale of the problems they are meant to address.

If we are serious about staying, we need widespread public engagement. Behind facile debates about supporting the troops lie crucial questions. How exactly do we define success? What are our ultimate goals and objectives? What is our strategy for achieving them? Finding answers has been difficult partly because information has been so hard to come by. All public communication from the departments operating in Afghanistan (even from senior civil servants) must now be cleared by the Prime Minister’s Office.

In November 2006, the Conservative government spent a reported $76,000 on focus groups to evaluate its communications strategy on Afghanistan. The results suggested that justifying the mission as a response to terrorism and through appeals to freedom invoked, unfavourably, President Bush’s stance on the war in Iraq and that the preferred language would emphasize progress, development, and our commitment to reconstruction. This raises perhaps the most important question about Can­adian involvement in Afghanistan: how do we explain our inability to live up to the political rhetoric surrounding 3D peace-building?

It may be that 3D is not what it seems, that the mission we’re being sold obscures less palatable objectives. The incentive to dress hard military object­ives in soft humanitarian clothing has been present from the start, regardless of the party in charge. Protecting the country from future terrorist attacks is certainly as important as projecting humanitarian values, but there is no honour or integrity in mistaking one for the other.

It’s also possible that the strategy itself is flawed. Perhaps the civil service and ISAF are currently incapable of the type of collaboration 3D requires. And even if the political will is there, the resources may be lacking. Peace-building experiences in Africa and the Balkans suggest that the overall international contribution to Afghanistan remains substantially below the levels of military and economic support usually ne­cessary to rebuild a state. Our talk of 3D peace-building may ultimately be too ambitious for the circumstances. However, this conclusion suggests an uncomfortable set of alternatives: either we aren’t truly committed to Afghanistan, or such nation-building projects are beyond our capacity.

But if the principles of 3D are sound, and the challenges are part and parcel of implementing a new approach, then actually putting the strategy into action should make a marked difference. In this case, 3D offers Canada a unique opportunity to once again demonstrate international leadership on issues of peace and security.

One conclusion is absolutely clear: lives, resources, and opportunities are at stake, and only after we have defined exactly what we intend to accomplish in Afghanistan will we be able to assess the prospects for success and justify the necessary sacrifices.